Incentives to Advertise and Economic Efficiency: The Difference Between Beef and Beer by Hunnicutt, Lynn & Israelsen, L. Dwight
Utah State University 
DigitalCommons@USU 
Economic Research Institute Study Papers Economics and Finance 
2001 
Incentives to Advertise and Economic Efficiency: The Difference 
Between Beef and Beer 
Lynn Hunnicutt 
Utah State University 
L. Dwight Israelsen 
Utah State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/eri 
Recommended Citation 
Hunnicutt, Lynn and Israelsen, L. Dwight, "Incentives to Advertise and Economic Efficiency: The Difference 
Between Beef and Beer" (2001). Economic Research Institute Study Papers. Paper 229. 
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/eri/229 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Economics and Finance at DigitalCommons@USU. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Economic Research 
Institute Study Papers by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please 
contact digitalcommons@usu.edu. 
Economic Research Institute Study Paper 
ERI#2001-16 
INCENTIVES TO ADVERTISE AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: 
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BEEF AND BEER 
by 
LYNN HUNNICUTT 
and 
L. DWIGHT ISRAELSEN 
Department of Economics 
Utah State University 
3530 Old Main Hill 
Logan, UT 84322-3530 
June 2001 
INCENTIVES TO ADVERTISE AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: 
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BEEF AND BEER 
Lynn Hunnicutt, Assistant Professor 
L. Dwight Israelsen, Professor 
Department of Economics 
Utah State University 
3530 Old Main Hill 
Logan, UT 84322-3530 
11 
The analyses and views reported in this paper are those of the author(s). They are not necessarily 
endorsed by the Department of Economics or by Utah State University. 
Utah State University is committed to the policy that all persons shall have equal access to its 
programs and employment without regard to race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, age, 
marital status, disability, public assistance status, veteran status, or sexual orientation. 
Information on other titles in this series may be obtained from: Department of Economics, Utah 
State University, 3530 Old Main Hill, Logan, Utah 84322-3530. 
Copyright © 2001 by Lynn Hunnicutt and L. Dwight Israelsen. All rights reserved. Readers 
may make verbatim copies of this document for noncommercial purposes by any means, provided 
that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
111 
INCENTIVES TO ADVERTISE AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: 
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BEEF AND BEER 
Lynn Hunnicutt and L. Dwight Israelsen 
ABSTRACT 
There is some debate about whether firms advertise too much or too little. We present a 
simple model to examine the incentives of a firm to advertise, and distinguish between the 
market-expansion effect and the business-stealing effect of advertising. Firms advertise 
homogeneous products (beef) too little relative to the amount that would maximize total industry 
profits. The possibility of stealing customers from competitors causes firms in differentiated 
products markets (beer) to advertise too much. Finally, we derive conditions that determine 
when an expansion in one firm's advertising level increases rival advertising. 
INCENTIVES TO ADVERTISE AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: 
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BEEF AND BEER 
INTRODUCTION 
There is some debate about whether consumers face too much or too little advertising. 
Bagwell and Ramey (1994) find that there may be too little advertising in equilibrium, if ads 
serve to coordinate buyers and sellers. Nelson (1974) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) claim 
that since advertising itself signals product quality (irrespective of content), there may be too 
little advertising in equilibrium. Benham (1972) finds that advertising that is informative 
increases competition and reduces prices paid by consumers. On the other hand, Tremblay and 
Tremblay (1995) point out that there may be more advertising than is optimal, especially if 
advertising is costly, uninformative, or used to sell consumers things they do not need. Dixit and 
Norman (1978), and comments by Fisher and McGowan (1979) and Shapiro (1980), show that if 
advertising does not enlarge the size of the market, it reduces social welfare. 
All of the above papers discuss advertising in differentiated goods industries (i.e., beer). 
There is a large literature on what is called generic advertising, focusing mainly on agricultural 
products (i.e., beef),l although these papers do not directly address individual producer 
incentives to fund generic advertising. Instead, they assume the presence of an agency with 
power to tax production and obtain the optimal amount of funding for generic advertising 
campaigns. Here, we ask whether individual producers would be willing to fund advertising, in 
the absence of such a taxing agency. Generally speaking, the answer turns out to be no. As we 
demonstrate below, since the main role of generic advertising is to expand the size of the market, 
additional advertising, absent a taxing authority, only the advertising firm bears the cost. This 
makes incentives to advertise generic products lower than optimal. 
ISee, for example, Freebairn and Alston (2001), Piggott, Piggott and Wright (1995), Wohlgenant (1993), 
Kinnucan, Xiao and Hsia (1996), Chung and Kaiser (2000), Kaiser (1997), Kinnucan and Miao (2000), and Schmidt, 
Reberte and Kaiser (1997). For book-length treatments of generic advertising, see Kinnucan, Thompson and Chang 
(1992), and Forker and Ward (1993). 
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We modify a model first applied to worker decisions in collectives and communes to 
examine the incentives to advertise. In the model, advertising may increase demand for all 
products in the industry (the market-size effect), and/or reallocate demand from one firm to 
another (the business-stealing effect). The market-size effect represents an externality created by 
the advertising firm for all competitors in the industry. The business stealing effect describes the 
shift of demand from one competitor to another within the same industry. Because it is not 
present in homogeneous goods industries, generic advertising may increase the size of the 
market, but it will not allow one producer to take market share away from other producers of the 
same product.2 We show that when business stealing is not possible, the competitive equilibrium 
level of advertising is smaller than that which would maximize industry profits. In contrast, 
business stealing is possible in differentiated goods industries. When firms can reallocate sales 
toward themselves by increasing their advertising, incentives to advertise are too strong, and the 
competitive equilibrium number of ads is larger than that which would maximize industry 
profits. 
After examining the effect of a firm's own advertising, we look at the effect of 
competitors' advertisements. Not surprisingly, as long as generic advertising increases industry 
sales (the market-expansion effect), it also increases each firm's profit, whether or not they 
contributed toward the advertising. Thus, we have a free-rider problem, and without some sort 
of taxing authority, the amount of generic advertising provided will be less than that which 
would maximize industry profits. In a differentiated-products industry, as long as the average 
benefit to advertising is falling, rival advertisements reduce own profit. That is, manufacturers 
in differentiated-goods industries would be better off if their rivals advertised less, while those in 
homogeneous-goods industries would be better off if their rivals advertised more. 
2Kinnucan, Xiao and Hsia (1996) consider the effect of increased beef promotion on the demand for 
chicken and pork. In our partial-equilibrium analysis, these effects are not identical to business stealing. Indeed, if 
we consider spending on all goods and assume that advertising does not increase household wealth or income, the 
only effect possible is the business-stealing effect. 
Finally, we look at the effect offirmj's advertising on firm i's incentive to 
advertise, and find that if the business-stealing effect is not present, advertisen1ents are 
strategic substitutes. Increased advertiseluents by firm} reduces the n1arginal profit from 
an additional ad by firm i, reducing the equilibrium level of advertising firn1 i wishes to 
do. In industries where the business-stealing effect is present, the effect is luore 
complicated. In fact, the results may be reversed. Especially for dominant firn1s in 
concentrated industries, ads are likely to be strategic complements, so that increased 
advertising by rivals may increase the dominant firm's incentive to advertise. We 
discuss the applicability of this result to advertising for beer, and suggest that the rise of 
smaller brewers may have led the industry's major players (Anheuser-Bush, Coors and 
Miller) to increase their advertising expenditures. 
THE MODEL 
This model is related to that presented in Israelsen (1980), which was applied to 
work incentives in collectives and communes. Each firm's profit is given by 
'1=SiF(A,X)-c(ai ) , where Sj is the firm's share of industry revenue Fe), which depends 
on total industry advertising (A) and other industry inputs (X). Profits are reduced by the 
cost of the firm's advertising, e(a;. The firm's share of industry revenue (Si) depends on 
the structure of the industry, as we will see below. 
In the generic advertising case, products are homogeneous, so each firm takes its 
share of the market as given and its profit depends only on the number of firms in the 
industry. In particular, when products cannot be differentiated in consumers' minds, 
advertising done by anyone firm does not affect its share of market revenue. These are 
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the "competitive" industries of economics textbooks. In this case, the firm's profit 
function is 
h 1 
If. = - F( A,X)-c(a/. ). 
I n 
For simplicity, assume that the n firms in the industry are identical , so that each of 
then1 gets an equal share of industry revenue. To ensure a finite level of advertising, we 
assume Fl > 0 , Fi 1 ~O ,and c' (.) > 0 , so that advertising raises revenue but at a 
decreasing rate. In this market, firm i's revenue depends on total industry advertising 
and the nmnber of cOlnpetitors in the industry . 
A second type of industry is one in which products are differentiated, so that 
advertising for product i causes consumers to believe that the good is distinct. In this 
case, the firm's profit function is given by 
In a differentiated-goods industry, firm i's revenue depends both on total industry 
advertising, and on its share of that total. Many consumer goods companies face revenue 
functions like this one. Microbrewers benefit if their own share of industry 
advertisements (a i) rises, since this will cause those buying larger brewers' brands to 
consider switching. Additionally, microbrewers may benefit from their own advertising if 
they attract new customers to the market. In fact, increased rival advertising may 
increase a microbrewer's sales, since ads by competitors draw consumers to the grocery 
store cooler, or to the neighborhood bar, where they may end up purchasing these smaller 
brands. 
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In this industry, advertising has two effects. First, when firm i increases its share 
of industry advertising, it is able to attract customers that formerly went to competitors. 
. b . 1" 1 d ( a i ) 1 r aidA J . . . Tl d f'C ThIS USIness stea Ing eXIsts wlen -  - =- 1--- IS posItIve. le secon elect 
ai A A " A dai 
of advertising is the market expansion effect. This occurs when firm i' s advertising 
increases total industry advertising and thus attracts new consunlers to the industry. All 
firms in the industry benefit from a positive market-expansion effect, which occurs when 
dA / da; ~ 0 . Notice that when market expansion fails, dA / da; :::; 0 , the business-stealing 
condition is guaranteed. If ads by firm i are offset by fewer industry ads, then firnl i' s 
revenue rises only because it is stealing some of the industry's existing customers from 
its rivals (without increasing the number of customers purchasing in the industry). Also 
note that the larger firm i's share of industry advertising, a . / A , the smaller the response 
I 
of industry ads to increases in i's advertisements must be in order for i to steal business 
from its competitors. Firms that already do most of an industry's advertising have a hard 
time stealing business from their rivals through additional advertisements. 
Notice that in homogeneous and differential industries, total profit earned in the 
industry is given by 
I1=F(A,X)- L c(ai) 
i 
At the industry optimum, dI1 / dA = 0 , which implies aF = Li de dai . That is, 
aA dai dA 
the increase in industry revenue caused by an additional industry advertisement must 
equal the total marginal cost of ads. In the private solution, d 1[ / da = 0 , which might 
I 
lead to over- or underinvestment in advertising. 
INCENTIVES TO ADVERTISE 
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To determine the effect of an increase in generic advertising on firm i's profit, 
we use the following first-order condition 
h dn· I 8F dA de I 
Firm i maximizes its profit by setting d 7r. / da. = 0 , which in1plies that it 
1 I 
advertises until the marginal cost of its own advertising, de / da · , is equal to its share of 
/ 
incremental industry profit from advertising, (1/ n)(aF / aA)(dA / da j ) . 
From the industry's point of view, firm i's ads should be set to satisfy 
dTI / dai = (aF / aA)(dA / da i ) - de / da i = o· Evaluating the industry's first-order condition 
at the privately optimal level of advertising, and assUlning that competitors do not 
completely offset additional ads by firm i with reductions in their own 
advertising( dA / da > 0 )3 we have i-
~: = ~~ -~ : = ~~ ::, (l-~)~O. 
So we see that industry profits could be increased if there were more generic 
advertising than is privately optimal. Thus, in the homogeneous-goods industry, without 
some sort of taxing authority empowered to force each firm to pay for advertisements, 
firm i advertises too little. 
In the differentiated-product industry, the competitive equilibrium solves each 
firm's first-order condition as follows: 
3This assumption guarantees that increased advertising by any firm expands the market. This is 
certainly true in generic advertising, as this is the only reason for firms to advertise . We believe that it is 
also true in most (but not all) differentiated products industries. The alternative (that increased advertising 
reduces the size of the market) doesn't seem reasonable for most products, since firms always have the 
option of reducing their advertising, and if advertising drives customers away then firms are likely to do so. 
6 
d;rf = F(A,X)[l_ ai dA]+ ai~ JF _ dc .. 
dal A A dai Adal JA dal 
In the homogeneous- goods equilibriUln, the industry benefit of the last 
advertisen1ent, JF / JA , was n times larger than its cost. Here, the industry benefit to 
firm i's last advertisement may not be n times larger than its cost for two reasons. First, 
(a j / A)( dA / daj ) may be larger or smaller than 1/ n.4 If it is larger (that is, firm i 
does more than its share of industry advertising), then the industry benefit to finn i' s 
marginal ad may be less than n times its cost. The marginal ads of the largest firm in the 
industry may actually benefit the industry very little. 
Second, firm i's ads may enable it to steal customers from its rivals. If this 
business-stealing effect, given by d / dai(a j / A) = [I-aidA / AdaJ / A is positive, firm i steals 
business from its rivals when it increases its own advertising. Notice that as firm i 
increases its share of industry advertising ( a . / A approaches one), stealing customers 
/ 
from rivals becomes increasingly difficult. Industry leaders' advertisements serve mainly 
to expand the market, not to steal business from rivals. 
As with generic advertising, we can compare the industry optimum with private 
firm incentives by evaluating the industry first-order condition at the competitive 
equilibrium level of advertisement. Assuming that the industry advertising level changes 
no more than firm i's advertisements ( dA / da . ~ 1 ), we see that 
/ 
dfI = 8F (1- ai J dA _ F (1- ai dA J ~ 0 .
dai 8A A daj A A dai 
4We will assume that dA / da . ~ O. That is , an increase in firm i' s ads does not lead to a 
comp.letely offsetting reduction in ads by/firm i' s competitors. This makes (a j / A)(dA / daj ) non-
negatIve. 
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In differentiated-products industries, dI1 / dai ~ 0 , since our assun1ptions about 
the shape of F(A. X) guarantee that for large enough A, 8F / 8A - F / A < 0 ' and 
since dA / da· < I ilnplies that (1 - a I A)dA I da . ~ 1- a .dA I Ada . · Given the concavity 1 - I I I I 
of the revenue function F(A. X), firms in differentiated products industries advertise past 
the socially optimal level. The ability to steal business fron1 cOlnpetitors gives firms a 
larger incentive to advertise than is optimal for the industry as a whole. When firms can 
steal customers from one another, each of them advertises too much. 
THE EFFECT OF RIVAL ADVERTISING ON PROFITS 
To examine the effect of rival advertising on firm i's profit, we look at how ads 
created by firm} affect firm i's profit. It is straightforward to show in the competitive 
case that d7r:1 / dai = (1/n)(8FI8A)(dAldaj) ' which is almost certain to be non-negative 
(since the marginal productivity of advertising, 8F / 8A ' is non-negative, and industry 
advertising is not likely to fall as firm) increases its own advertising: (dA / da . ~ 0) . 
.I 
Thus, firm i's profit rises as generic advertising paid for by firm} increases. This tells us 
that no matter how much it advertises, firm i wishes its rivals to increase their own 
advertising. Since the only effect of generic advertising is the market expansion effect, 
all advertising for which it pays nothing benefits firm i. In fact, other things equal, 
advertising by firm} benefits firm i more than firm i's own advertising, since the effect 
on revenue is the same but the cost of the advertising is borne by someone else. That is, 
firm}'s advertising is more than a perfect complement for firm i's advertising, from the 
viewpoint of firm i. 
In the differentiated-goods industry, we see both the market-expansion effect and 
the business-stealing effect. The derivative of interest is given by 
8 
dJ[~ / da j = (a;dA/ Adaj ) (8F / 8A-F / A) , which is likely to be negative. Assuming that the 
average product of advertising FIA is falling, we know the second term on the right-hand 
side is negative. As in the homogeneous-goods industry, if advertising by firm} does not 
reduce total industry advertising, so that if dA / da . :2: 0 , then drc d / da . ~ O. In 
) I ) 
differentiated-goods industries with extensive advertising (such that the average product 
of advertising is falling), the business-stealing effect outweighs the industry expansion 
effect. In this case, firm i wishes its rivals to reduce their advertising, as additional ads 
by finn} reduce i's profit. Advertisements are substitutes, in that more advertising by 
firm} reduces the profit that firm i receives. 
THE EFFECT OF COMPETITOR'S ADS ON INCENTIVES 
Next, we examine the effect of an increase in firmj's advertising on firm i's 
Inarginal profit, and thus on firm i's incentive to advertise. In the language of Bulow, 
Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985), we are interested in knowing whether 
advertisements are strategic substitutes or complements. To examine this issue, we 
calculate d 2J[ . / da .da . . If dA / da . , is constant, we see that in the homogeneous-goods 
I I } I 
industry 
d
2
"t 1 [82 F dA 8F d2 A] 1 82 F dA 
da;daj = -;:; 8A2 da; + 8A da;daj = -;:; 82 A da; ~ o. 
Thus, an increase in firm}'s advertising reduces the marginal profitability of firm 
i's advertisements. The more advertising done by firm}, the lower the marginal benefit 
to advertising for all other firms. This discourages firm i from advertising, which 
reinforces our conclusion that there is too little advertising in a homogeneous-goods 
industry. In homogeneous-goods industries, since the only effect of advertising is to 
expand the market (benefitting all firms in the industry), an advertisement paid for by 
9 
firm} is just as effective as an advertisement firm i pays for itself, but less costly. 
Advertisements are guaranteed to be strategic complenlents. Increased advertising by a 
rival reduces the nlarginal benefit of advertising, without changing its cost. 
In differentiated-products industries, the effects are nlore conlplex, because 
advertising not only increases the size of the market, it also allows firms to steal business 
from one another. 
d Hi 1 dA 3F F da i 2a i dA ai dA 3 F 2 d [ J ( J2 2 
daida j = A dai\ aA - Ajl+ da j -A da, +-.4 d a, aA2 
It is clear that when dA / da is zero, advertisenlents by rival firnls are neither 
I 
strategic substitutes or strategic complements. In this case, additional advertisements by 
finn) do not affect the marginal profitability of firm i ' s ads, and thus do not change firm 
i's incentive to advertise. 
If dA / da· = 1 , we have 
1 
2 d 2 
d tri 113F Fj( 2ai J ai 3 F 
daidaj = A 3A --:4 I-A +A 3A2 
This derivative can be either positive or negative. The first part 
(1/ A)(8F /8A - F / A) is negative. The third part (a. / A)(32 F /3A2) is also negative. 
I 
Thus, if 1- 2a . / A > 0 <=> a . < A / 2, we know that this cross-partial derivative is negative 
I - 1-
and ads are strategic complements. In this case, an advertisement by firm} serves to 
remind customers that the product exists and to reduce the marginal profitability of firm 
i's advertisements. Firm i would improve its profit by advertising less and relying on the 
business expansion effects offirmj's advertisements. So, if Anheuser-Busch, for 
example, increases its advertising, microbreweries will wish to reduce their advertising. 
If a . > A / 2 , that is if the firm already has does more than half of the industry 
I 
advertising, the cross-partial derivative may be positive, so that ads are strategic 
10 
substitutes. Thus, it is possible that when microbreweries increase their advertising level , 
Anheuser-Busch may also need to increase the number of ads it runs, in order to Inaintain 
its market position. More advertising by rivals increases the Inarginal profitability of 
own advertising for an industry' s largest advertiser. 5 
In differentiated industries, increased advertising by firm} reduces the incentive 
for firm i to advertise as long as firm i is a minor contributor to total industry 
advertisements (a " is less than one-half of the industry total). Only for a dominant firm 
I 
would incentives to advertise increase in response to increased rival advertising. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has examined the incentives of a firm to advertise in both 
homogeneous- and differentiated-products industries. Advertising has two effects-it 
may expand the market, thus increasing the welfare of all firms in the industry, and it 
may induce customers of one firm to purchase from a competing firm instead. This 
business-stealing effect is present only when products are differentiated. We show that 
when business stealing is not possible, individual firm incentives to advertise are too low, 
and fewer ads than would maximize industry profit are produced. This suggests why 
many agricultural industries include cooperatives and checkoff programs to purchase 
generic advertising designed to expand the market. In differentiated-products industries, 
the possibility of stealing customers from a rival increases the incentive of the firm to 
advertise, making the privately optimal level of advertising too large. 
5While direct evidence ofth"e strategic incentive to advertise is difficult to obtain (as it involves 
strategies that firms do not often make public), it is well known that Anheuser-Busch has close to half of 
the market for beer in the United States, and is also the industry's largest advertiser. In addition to 
increasing advertising, large brewers are moving into the specialty beer niche, buying up smaller companies 
but continuing to sell beer under their name. 
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Next, we look at the effect of an increase in firmj's advertising level on firm i's 
optin1al choice of advertising. In homogeneous-goods industries, we find that an 
increase in firn1j's advertising level increases the profit of firn1 i, and reduces the 
marginal benefit to firm i of advertising, so that firm i advertises less. That is, generic 
ads are strategic substitutes. In differentiated-goods industries, an increase in firn1 j' s 
advertising level likely reduces the profit of firm i , but can either decrease or increase the 
marginal benefit to firm i of advertising. Hence, in differentiated-goods industries, ads 
n1ay be strategic substitutes or strategic complements. For smaller finns (those that 
perforn1 less than half of industry advertising) , the Inarket expansion effect dominates, 
and advertisements are strategic substitutes. Only for the largest advertisers in a 
differentiated industry is it possible that the business-stealing effect dominates, which 
makes ads strategic con1plements. 
This paper does not make claims regarding socially optimal levels of advertising, 
because we have not considered consumer welfare. In both types of industries, the 
privately optimal level of advertising is not likely to maximize social welfare, as it does 
not even maximize industry-wide profits. Further results are difficult to obtain without 
examining the effects of advertisements on consumer utility. 
Extensions of this work include looking at the effect of increased industry 
advertisements on individual firm incentives to advertise. Especially in homogeneous 
goods industries, where private advertisements need to be supplemented by industry 
group advertising levels, it would be useful to characterize the effects of a rise in A on the 
optimal level of a;. It would also be useful to examine the effect of mergers on incentives 
to advertise. When two firms merge, their share of industry advertising will (at least 
12 
initially) rise. Depending on what one assumes about how final shares adjust, one n1ay 
see larger or smaller incentives to advertise, which may increase or reduce social welfare. 
13 
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There is some debate about whelherfirms advertise too much or 
too little. We present a simple model to examine the incentives of a firm to 
advertise. and distinguish betvveen the l11,arket-expansion effect and the 
business-stealing effect of advertising. Firms advertise homogeneous 
products (beef) 100 little relative to the amount that would maximize total 
industry profits. The possibility of stealing customers from competitors 
causes firms in differentiated products markets (beer) to advertise too 
much. Finally, we derive conditions that determine when an expansion in 
one firm's advertising level increases rival advertising. 
INTRODUCTION 
There is some debate about whether consumers face too much or too little 
advertising. Bagwell and Ramey (1994) find that there may be too little advertising in 
equilibrium, if ads serve to coordinate buyers and sellers. Nelson (1974) and Milgrom 
and Roberts (1986) claim that since advertising itself signals product quality (irrespective 
of content), there may be too little advertising in equilibrium. Benham (1972) finds that 
advertising that is infonnative increases competition and reduces prices paid by 
consumers. On the other hand, Tremblay and Tremblay (1995) point out that there may 
be more advertising than is optimal, especially if advertising is costly, uninformative, or 
used to sell consumers things they do not need. Dixit and Norman (1978), and comments 
by Fisher and McGowan (1979) and Shapiro (1980), show that if advertising does not 
enlarge the size of the market, it reduces social welfare. 
All of the above papers discuss advertising in differentiated goods industries (i.e. 
beer). There is a large literature on what is called generic advertising, focusing mainly 
on agricultural products (i.e. beef), I although these papers do not directly address 
individual producer incentives to fund generic advertising. Instead, they assume the 
presence of an agency with power to tax production and obtain the optimal amount of 
funding for generic advertising campaigns. Here, we ask whether individual producers 
would be willing to fund advertising, in the absence of such a taxing agency. Generally 
speaking, the answer turns out to be no. As we demonstrate below, since the main role of 
generic advertising is to expand the size of the market, additional advertising benefits all 
producers. Although everyone benefits from such advertising, absent a taxing authority, 
only the advertising firm bears the cost. This makes incentives to advertise generic 
products lower than optimal. 
We modify a model first applied to worker decisions in collectives and 
communes to examine the incentives to advertise. In the model, advertising may increase 
demand for all products in the industry (the market-size effect), and/or reallocate demand 
from one firm to another (the business-stealing effect). The market-size effect 
represents an externality created by the advertising firm for all competitors in the 
industry. The business stealing effect describes the shift of demand from one competitor 
ISee, for example, Freebairn and Alston (200 I) , Piggott, Piggott and Wright (1995), Wohlgenant 
(1993), Kinnucan, Xiao and Hsia (1996), Chung and Kaiser (2000), Kaiser (1997), Kinnucan and Miao 
(2000), and Schmidt, Reberte and Kaiser (1997). For book-length treatments of generic advertising, see 
Kinnucan, Thompson and Chang (1992), and Forker and Ward (1993). 
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to another within the same industry. Because it is not present in homogeneous goods 
industries, generic advertising may increase the size of the market, but it will not allow 
one producer to take market share away fron1 other producers of the same product. 2 We 
show that when business stealing is not possible, the competitive equilibriun1 level of 
advertising is smaller than that which would maximize industry profits. In contrast, 
business stealing is possible in differentiated goods industries. When firn1s can reallocate 
sales toward themselves by increasing their advertising, incentives to advertise are too 
strong, and the cOlnpetitive equilibrium nun1ber of ads is larger than that which would 
maximize industry profits. 
After examining the effect of a firm's own advertising, we look at the effect of 
competitors' advertisements. Not surprisingly, as long as generic advertising increases 
industry sales (the market-expansion effect), it also increases each firm's profit, whether 
or not they contributed toward the advertising. Thus, we have a free-rider problem, and 
without some sort of taxing authority, the amount of generic advertising provided will be 
less than that which would maximize industry profits. In a differentiated-products 
industry, as long as the average benefit to advertising is falling, rival advertisements 
reduce own profit. That is, manufacturers in differentiated-goods industries would be 
better off if their rivals advertised less, while those in homogeneous-goods industries 
would be better off if their rivals advertised more. 
2Kinnucan, Xiao and Hsia (1996) consider the effect of increased beef promotion on the demand 
for chicken and pork. In our partial-equilibrium analysis, these effects are not identical to business stealing. 
Indeed, if we consider spending on all goods and assume that advertising does not increase household 
wealth or income, the only effect possible is the business-stealing effect. 
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